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INTRODUCTION
In the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment,1 the framers supposedly
intended to mandate a separation of church and state. The Supreme Court has
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treated this statement as a truism.2 Given how the Establishment Clause is equated
with church-state separation, one finds surprisingly little evidence that the framers
intended anything like church-state separation.
This article asserts that the church-state separation interpretation of
Establishment Clause history is simply wrong. The framers were focused on the first
five words of the amendment, which read: “Congress shall make no law respecting
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .” The
original Establishment Clause was a guarantee that the federal government would
not interfere in state regulation of religion—whatever form that state regulation took.
Rather than enacting the Establishment Clause to mandate a separation of church and
state, the framers adopted the clause to protect divergent state practices—including
state establishment of religion, which continued in several states when the
Establishment Clause was enacted.
As Thomas Jefferson himself later
acknowledged, the Establishment Clause had much in common with the Tenth
Amendment, which also protected states’ rights from federal interference.
Part II of this article reviews federal laws and practices at the time when the
Establishment Clause was enacted. Part II notes that the prevalence of government
aid to religion in early America is inconsistent with contentions that the
Establishment Clause mandated a separation of church and state.
Part III reviews some of the congressional discussions that resulted in the
enactment of the Establishment Clause. Part III concludes that nothing in the
legislative history relating to the Establishment Clause suggests that the framers
intended to endorse a separation of church and state. To the contrary, this history
indicates that by adopting the Establishment Clause, the framers agreed that the
federal government would not interfere in state religious regulation.
Part IV concludes that with respect to the Establishment Clause, the framers were
committed to the principal of federalism. Of the framers, Jefferson has been closely
connected with arguments for church-state separation, given his Jefferson’s letter
that described a “wall of separation between Church and State.”3 Although Jefferson
wrote about the Establishment Clause on a number of other occasions, none of these
writings advocated a policy of church-state separation. Instead, Jefferson wrote that
the power to regulate religion must “rest with the States, as far as it can be in any
human authority.”4 In other words, Jefferson viewed the Establishment Clause as
endorsing the non-interference principle described in Part III.
After discussing Jefferson’s writings, Part IV reviews other statements about the
Establishment Clause penned during the framing period. Jefferson’s federalist
description of the Establishment Clause was not an aberration. Like Jefferson, other
2

See, e.g., Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 236 (1977) (citing “the wall of separation
that must be maintained between church and state” as a basis for striking down some forms of
state aid to private religious schools); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 425 (1962) (holding that
prayer in the public schools “breaches the constitutional wall of separation between Church
and State”).
3

Letter from Thomas Jefferson to a Committee of the Danbury Baptist Association (Jan.
1, 1802), in 16 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 281, 282 (Andrew A. Lipscomb ed.,
1905).
4
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to the Rev. Samuel Miller (Jan. 23, 1808), in 11 THE
WRITINGS OF THOMAS J EFFERSON 428, 428 (Andrew A. Lipscomb ed., 1905) (hereinafter
“Letter to Reverend Miller”).
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framing era sources largely omit any discussion of church-state separation. Also like
Jefferson, framing era sources again and again state that the Establishment Clause
was adopted to preclude federal interference in state regulation of religion.
Part V reviews the origins of modern Establishment Clause activism in Everson
v. Board of Education.5 Part V discusses the surprisingly sloppy and inaccurate
statement of Establishment Clause history in Everson, which culminated with Justice
Hugo Black’s conclusion that the framers enacted the Establishment Clause to
mandate a separation of church and state.
Part V discusses the bitter irony in the modern Supreme Court’s Establishment
Clause activism. The framers enacted the Establishment Clause as a shield, to
protect state religious regulation from federal interference. However, the Supreme
Court has transformed the Establishment Clause into a sword, which gives federal
judges the power to meddle in areas traditionally reserved to the states. Through bad
history and questionable public policy, the Supreme Court has created an
Establishment Clause that is the exact opposite of what the framers intended.
II. LAWS AND STATEMENTS IN THE EARLY FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
Early federal laws and practices are entirely inconsistent with the argument that
the Establishment Clause mandated the separation of church and state. Just three
days before Congress enacted the Establishment Clause, the same Congress
approved a salary for a chaplain to lead Congress in prayer. Presidents Washington,
Adams, and Madison each established a national holiday for prayer. In addition, a
number of early statesmen—including President Washington—spoke of the
importance of an active role for religion in public life. In short, the practices and
statements of the early federal government were contrary to a separation of church
and state.
A. Early Federal Laws and Practices
1. Thanksgiving Proclamations
The first Congress urged President Washington to proclaim “a day of public
thanksgiving and prayer, to be observed by acknowledging with grateful hearts the
many and signal favors of Almighty God.”6 President Washington selected
November 26, 1789 as a day of thanksgiving to offer “our prayers and supplications
to the great Lord and Ruler of Nations . . . .”7 Although Jefferson broke from this
practice when he served as President, both John Adams and James Madison
designated special days for Thanksgiving and prayer.8
5

Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).

6

GEORGE WASHINGTON, P ROCLAMATION FOR A N ATIONAL THANKSGIVING (Oct. 3,
1789), reprinted in 12 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON: BEING H IS
CORRESPONDENCE, ADDRESSES, M ESSAGES, AND O THER P APERS, O FFICIAL AND P RIVATE
119 (1834).
7

GEORGE WASHINGTON, P ROCLAMATION FOR A N ATIONAL THANKSGIVING (Oct. 3,
1789), reprinted in 1 J. RICHARDSON, A COMPILATION OF THE M ESSAGES AND P APERS OF
THE P RESIDENTS 1789-1897, at 64 (1899).
8

JOHN ADAMS, P ROCLAMATION FOR A N ATIONAL F AST (Mar. 6, 1799) (quoting
Proverbs 14:34), reprinted in 9 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, S ECOND P RESIDENT OF THE
UNITED S TATES 172, 173 (1850) (recommending that “that Thursday, the twenty-fifth day of
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2. Legislative Prayer and Military Chaplains
As Christopher Lund has demonstrated,9 legislative prayer was a widely
recognized practice in early America. The first federal legislative prayer dates from
the 1774 meeting of the Continental Congress in Philadelphia.10 In the following
years, both the House and Senate began their sessions with a prayer. By 1789, the
practice was so well-established that both houses of Congress appointed chaplains.
On September 22, 1789, Congress enacted a statute, setting the chaplains salaries at
$500 a year.11 This act was passed just three days before Congress reached
agreement on the bill of rights—including the Establishment Clause.12
Like legislative prayer, federal support for military chaplains was in place long
before Congress adopted the Establishment Clause and continued after the clause
was enacted. In 1775, the Continental Congress approved the first army chaplain.13
In addition to authorizing legislative prayer, the first Congress enacted a statute that
provided for chaplains for the army.14 The practice of appointing and paying army
chaplains has continued up to the present day.15
The practice of appointing and compensating chaplains involved the direct
financial support of religion by the federal government. If the Establishment Clause
required a separation of church and state, such direct federal financing of religion
would have been inconsistent with the clause. Nonetheless, the first Congress
approved such financial support, without any suggestion that the aid violated the
Establishment Clause. This congressional action raises considerable doubt about
whether the framers read the Establishment Clause as requiring a separation of
church and state.
3. The Kaskaskia Indian Treaty
In 1803, President Thomas Jefferson proposed a treaty with the Kaskaskia Indian
Tribe. Jefferson’s proposal would appropriate federal funds to build a Catholic
church on the tribe’s lands, and would provide a salary to support a Catholic priest
who would tend to the tribe’s spiritual needs. The treaty ultimately ratified by
April next, be observed, throughout the United States of America, as a day of solemn
humiliation, fasting, and prayer”); J AMES M ADISON, A P ROCLAMATION, reprinted in 1 A
COMPILATION OF THE M ESSAGES AND P APERS OF THE P RESIDENTS 1789-1897, at 513
(James D. Richardson ed., 1899) (noting James Madison’s July 9, 1812 Proclamation calling
for a day of thanksgiving and prayer).
9

Christopher C. Lund, The Congressional Chaplaincies, 17 WM . & M ARY B ILL R TS. J.
1171 (2009).
10

Id. at 1177.

11

Act of Sept. 22, 1789, ch. 17, 1 Stat. 70-72.

12

Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 788 (1983). See also Lund, supra note 9, at 1184.

13

Klaus J. Herrmann, Some Considerations on the Constitutionality of the United States
Military Chaplaincy, 14 AM . U. L. REV. 24, 24-25 (1964).
14

Act of Mar. 3, 1791, ch. 28, 1 Stat. 222-24.

15

See Steven K. Green, Reconciling the Irreconcilable: Military Chaplains and the First
Amendment, 110 W. V A. L. REV. 167, 167 (2007) (describing military chaplains as
“[p]atently unconstitutional under almost any view of the Establishment Clause”).
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Congress provided: “And whereas the greater part of said tribe have been baptized
and received into the Catholic Church, to which they are much attached, the United
States will give annually, for seven years, one hundred dollars towards the support of
a priest of that religion, who will engage to perform for such tribe the duties of his
office, and also to instruct as many of their children as possible, in the rudiments of
literature, and the United States will further give the sum of three hundred dollars, to
assist the said tribe in the erection of a church.”16
Notably, this treaty was proposed by President Jefferson. Courts and scholars
have long associated Jefferson as the foremost proponent of the separation of church
and state.17 Yet it was Jefferson who convinced Congress to fund both the
construction of a Catholic church, and the funding of a Catholic priest.
4. References to Religion in the Northwest Territory Ordinance, the Declaration of
Independence and State Constitutions
Outside of the First Amendment, and the Article IV provision prohibiting
religious tests as a qualification for office,18 the United States Constitution makes no
reference to religion or God. But during the framing period, it was common for
constitutions and official documents to include such references. As Professor Daniel
L. Dreisbach observes: “The Declaration of Independence (1776), The Articles of
Confederation (1781), virtually all state constitutions, and other official documents
are replete with claims of Christian devotion and supplication to the Supreme
Being.”19
The Declaration of Independence begins by noting that all persons “are endowed
by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty,
and the Pursuit of Happiness.”20 During the framing period, state constitutions also
commonly referred to God or religion. For example, the Massachusetts Constitution
of 1780 declared: “It is the right as well as the duty of all men . . . to worship the

16

CHESTER J AMES ANTIEAU, ET AL., F REEDOM F ROM F EDERAL E STABLISHMENT:
F ORMATION AND E ARLY HISTORY OF THE F IRST AMENDMENT RELIGION C LAUSES 167
(1964).
17

See, e.g., Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947) (noting the wall separation
metaphor, which appeared in a letter written by Jefferson to the Danbury Baptist church). See
also infra text accompanying notes 61-62 (showing that Jefferson read the Establishment
Clause as guaranteeing federalism, rather than as a separation of church and state).
18

Article VI, clause 3 of the Constitution provides in part: “[N]o religious Test shall ever
be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States.” U.S.
CONST. art. VI, cl. 3.
19
Daniel L. Dreisbach, In Search of a Christian Commonwealth: An Examination of
Selected Nineteeth-Century Commentaries on References to God and the Christian Religion in
the United States Constitution, 48 BAYLOR L. REV. 927, 928-29 (1996).
20

THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2011

5

628

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59:623

Supreme Being, the great Creator and Preserver of the universe.”21 The Virginia
Constitution of 1776 described religion as “the duty we owe to our Creator . . . .”22
In an enactment much closer in time to the adoption of the First Amendment, the
first Congress enacted a charter to govern the Northwest Territory in 1787. Article
III of the Northwest Territory Ordinance provided: “Religion, morality, and
knowledge being necessary to good government and the happiness of mankind,
schools and the means of education shall forever be encouraged.”23 In this law,
many of the same men who would later approve the First Amendment described
“[r]eligion, morality, and knowledge” as “being necessary to good government.”
One should ask whether these same men, when they adopted the Establishment
Clause just a few short years later, now suddenly believed in the separation of church
and state.
5. Conscientious Objector Provision
In 1775, the Continental Congress exempt religious conscientious objectors from
service in the Revolutionary War. The conscientious objector resolution read:
As there are some people, who, from religious principles, cannot bear
arms in any case, this Congress intend no violence to their consciences,
but earnestly recommend it to them, to contribute liberally in this time of
universal calamity, to the relief of their distressed brethren in the several
colonies, and to do all other services to their oppressed Country, which
they can consistently with their religious principles.24
During the Civil War, conscription initially was left to the individual states.
However, after the federal government took control of the conscription process, the
1864 draft act exempted members of pacifist religious denominations from military
service.25 That same year, the Confederacy also exempted religious conscientious
objectors from conscription.26
Many years later, Justice John Harlan, Jr. stated that the conscientious objector
provisions violated the Establishment Clause because these provisions were
inconsistent with “the neutrality principle.”27 Justice Harlan was correct in his
21
MASS. CONST. OF 1780, pt. 1, art. II, reprinted in 5 THE FEDERAL AND STATE
CONSTITUTIONS 1889 (Francis N. Thorpe ed., 1909).

22

VA. CONST. OF 1776, DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, § 16, reprinted in 7 THE FEDERAL AND
STATE CONSTITUTIONS 3814 (Francis N. Thorpe ed., 1909).
23

Northwest Territory Ordinance of 1787, 1 Stat. 50.

24

RESOLUTION OF JULY 18, 1775, reprinted in 2 JOURNALS OF
CONGRESS, 1774-1789, at 189 (W. Ford ed. 1905 & photo. reprint 1968).
25

See United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 170-71 (1965).

26

Id.

THE

CONTINENTAL

27
Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 357 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). The Welsh
court plurality attempted to overcome the issue of religious favoritism by extending the
conscientious objector statute to any person who “deeply and sincerely holds beliefs that are
purely ethical or moral in source and content but that nevertheless impose upon him a duty of
conscience to refrain from participating in any war at any time . . . .” Id. at 340.
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observation that the conscientious objector provisions accorded special treatment to
objectors with a religious opposition to war, as opposed to individuals who did not
want to fight for other reasons. But contrary to Justice Harlan’s conclusion, no
evidence suggests that the framers believed that such a preference for religious
motivations violated the Establishment Clause.
B. Religion And The Federal Republic: The Civic Republicans
An important strand of early American thought asserted that religion was an
essential component of what George Washington referred to as “national morality.”28
Those who agreed with Washington on the connection between religious belief and
good government have become known as “civic republicans.” John Witte, Jr. writes
that “consistent with Puritan views, civic republicans sought to imbue the public
square with a common religious ethic and ethos—albeit one less denominationally
specific and rigorous than that countenanced by the Puritans.”29 As Witte correctly
observes, civic republican thought was one of many competing views on churchstate relationships.30 Nonetheless, the proponents of an active role for religion in
government included Benjamin Franklin, George Washington, and John Adams.
Given the stature of these proponents, the framing era views on the importance of
religion to political life cannot be dismissed lightly.
George Washington noted in his farewell address: “Of all the dispositions and
habits which lead to political prosperity, religion and morality are indispensable
supports. In vain would that man claim the tribute of patriotism who should labor to
subvert these great pillars of human happiness—these firmest props of the duties of
men and citizens.”31 Washington continued: “And let us with caution indulge the
supposition that morality can be maintained without religion. Whatever may be
conceded to the influence of refined education on minds of peculiar structure, reason
and experience both forbid us to expect that national morality can prevail in
exclusion of religious principle.”32
John Adams made a similar point in his correspondence, writing that the United
States Constitution “was made only for a moral and religious people. It is wholly
inadequate to the government of any other.”33 Adams continued that government
was not “capable of contending with human passions unbridled by morality and
religion.”34 Connecticut Senator Oliver Ellsworth described religious institutions as
28

George Washington, Farewell Address (Sept. 17, 1796), in 1 DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN
HISTORY 173 (Henry Steele Commager ed., 7th ed. 1963).
29

John Witte, Jr., The Essential Rights and Liberties of Religion in the American
Constitutional Experiment, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 371, 386 (1996). See also Stephen M.
Feldman, The Theory and Politics of First Amendment Protections: Why Does the Supreme
Court Favor Free Expression Over Religious Freedom?, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 431, 451-52
(2006) (“In republican democratic terms, Protestantism supposedly imbued citizens with
virtue and shaped their understanding of the common good.”).
30

Witte, supra note 29, at 378-88.

31

Washington, supra note 28, at 173.

32

Id.

33

Letter from John Adams to the Officers of the First Brigade of the Third Division of the
Militia of Massachusetts (Oct. 11, 1798), in 9 LIFE AND WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 229 (1854).
34

Id.
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“eminently useful and important” to the new Republic.35 And Supreme Court Justice
Joseph Story observed that “it is impossible for those, who believe in the truth of
Christianity, as a divine revelation, to doubt, that it is the especial duty of
government to foster, and encourage it among all the citizens and subjects.”36
The civic republican perspective also was reflected in the Northwest Territory
Ordinance. As noted above, Article III of the Northwest Territory Ordinance
provided that “[r]eligion, morality, and knowledge” were “necessary to good
government and the happiness of mankind.”37
A separation of church and state would be contrary to the philosophy expressed
by these civic republicans. Rather than desiring a separation of church and state,
civic republicans viewed religion and morality as essential components of the state.
For this reason, assistance and support of religion were critical state functions.
1. Summary
In the early years of the United States, the actions of the federal government were
not consistent with a desire to separate church and state. To the contrary, the federal
government endorsed legislative prayer, hired chaplains, built a church and hired a
priest for the Kaskaskia Indian Tribe, and spoke of the importance of religion in the
Northwest Territory Ordinance. The ordinance was consistent with the philosophy
of the civic republicans, who saw religion as necessary for good government. In
short, nothing in the early history of the federal government suggested an intent to
separate church and state.
III. THE DRAFTING OF THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
A number of other authors have written a detailed, point-by-point description of
each event that eventually resulted in the enactment of the Establishment Clause.38
This section is not intended to duplicate their work. Instead, this section focuses on
particular events in the enactment of the Establishment Clause. These events
illustrate that a church-state separation principle was precisely contrary to what the
framers intended. Instead, the framers sought to insure that the federal government
would not interfere with state regulation of religion.
Congress enacted the Establishment Clause and the other provisions of the Bill of
Rights in response to concerns raised by the Anti-Federalists. The Anti-Federalists
sought to prevent the formation of a federal government, arguing that states should
not ratify the new Constitution. The Anti-Federalists consistently stressed that the
federal government would exercise tyrannical power, usurping state authority. For
example, an Anti-Federalist who wrote under the pen name “Federal Farmer” wrote:
35
Oliver Ellsworth, Report of the Committee to Whom Was Referred the Petition of
Simeon Brown and Other (1802), in 11 THE PUBLIC RECORDS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT
371, 373 (Christopher Collier ed., 1967).
36

3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES
(1833) (Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1991).
37

ON THE

CONSTITUTION

OF THE

UNITED STATES 723

Northwest Territory Ordinance of 1787, art. III, 1 Stat. 50.

38

See, e.g., THOMAS J. CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS:
THE PASSAGE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 198-222 (1986).
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“Instead of seeing powers cautiously lodged in the hands of numerous legislators,
and many magistrates, we see all important power collecting in one centre, where a
few men will possess them almost at discretion.”39
In their opposition to the Constitution the Anti-Federalists emphasized that the
federal government would attempt to preempt state regulation of religion. Professor
Kurt Lash observes that among the Anti-Federalists, “the most common objection in
regard to congressional power and the subject of religion was that Congress might
attempt to regulate that subject as one of its express or implied responsibilities.”40
As noted by Lash, the criticisms leveled by an Anti-Federalist writing under the pen
name “An Old Whig” were typical:
[I]f a majority of the continental legislature should at any time think fit to
establish a form of religion, for the good people of this continent, with all
the pains and penalties which in other countries are annexed to the
establishment of a national church, what is there in the proposed
constitution to hinder their doing so? Nothing; for we have no bill of
rights, and every thing therefore is in their power and at their discretion.41
Similarly, at the New York ratifying convention, antifederalist Thomas Tredwell
wished “that sufficient caution had been used to secure to us our religious liberties,
and to have prevented the general government from tyrannizing over our consciences
by a religious establishment.”42
Those who sought ratification of the Constitution emphasized that the document
did not give the federal government any authority to regulate religion. For example,
when he spoke to the Virginia ratifying convention in 1788, Madison said: “There is
not a shadow of right in the general government to intermeddle with religion. Its
least interference with it, would be a most flagrant usurpation.”43 As noted below,
framers such as James Iredell in North Carolina and Edmund Randolph in Virginia
repeated Madison’s assertion that the federal government had no power over
religion.44
To obtain ratification of the Constitution, the Federalists promised to amend the
Constitution after the states had ratified the document. Professor Robert Natelson
writes that a central purpose of these amendments was to reassure moderates “that
the states would retain wide jurisdiction exclusive of the central government.”45
39

Letter from the “Federal Farmer” (Letter 5) (Oct. 13, 1787), in THE ORIGINS
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 295 (Michael Kammen ed., 1986).

OF THE

40

See Kurt T. Lash, Power and the Subject of Religion, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1069, 1084-85
(1998).
41
Essays of An Old Whig, PHILADELPHIA INDEP. GAZETTER, Oct. 1787, Feb. 1788,
reprinted in 3 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 37 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981).
42

1 JONATHAN ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 399 (2d ed. 1836).

ON THE

43

JAMES MADISON, REMARKS BEFORE THE VIRGINIA RATIFYING CONVENTION (June 12,
1788), reprinted in 5 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 88 (Phillip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner
eds., 1987).
44

See infra text accompanying notes 69-70.

45

Robert G. Natelson, The Original Meaning of the Establishment Clause, 14 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 73, 83 (2005).
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Even with this promise, Professor Natelson reports that in several states the decision
to ratify the Constitution passed by an extremely narrow margin.46
In drafting the Bill of Rights, Congress sought to reassure uneasy constituents
that the federal government would not interfere with the regulation of religion that
took place in the states. The original text of what became the Establishment Clause
was consistent with this purpose. James Madison’s original version of the First
Amendment religion clause provided: “The civil rights of none shall be abridged on
account of religious belief or worship, nor shall any national religion be established,
nor shall the full and equal rights of conscience be in any manner, or on any pretext,
infringed.”47
Madison’s draft was changed into the modern religion clauses largely as a result
of Representative Fisher Ames, who successfully proposed the following change in
Madison’s language: “Congress shall make no law establishing religion, or to
prevent the free exercise thereof, or to infringe the rights of conscience.”48 Much
more clearly than Madison’s proposal, Ames’ language focuses on limiting the
power of Congress and not the states. One must also note that Ames was a
representative of the State of Massachusetts. Ames’ home state continued to enforce
laws supporting the dominant Congregational Church for years after Congress
enacted the Establishment Clause. To take just one example, Massachusetts
collected “religious assessments”—tax revenues paid directly to the Congregational
Church.49 This practice continued until 1833.50
To read the Establishment Clause as mandating a separation of church and state
would mean that Fisher Ames wanted to require a separation of church and state,
even though the state that Ames represented did not practice such a separation. Why
would Fisher Ames promote such a constitutional amendment? The more plausible
explanation is that Ames—and everyone else in Congress—regarded the
Establishment Clause as limiting only the federal government, and not the states.
Far from mandating a separation of church and state, the framers enacted the
Establishment Clause to preserve diverse state methods of religious regulation—
including state establishments.
Another exchange during the framers’ discussion of the First Amendment
indicates that the amendment was designed to protect state religious establishments,
rather than to mandate a separation of church and state. During discussion of the
Establishment Clause in the House of Representatives, Madison was questioned
about whether the Establishment Clause might prohibit state establishments of
46

For example, Virginia ratified the Constitution by a vote of 89-79. In New York, the
vote was 30-27. In New Hampshire, the Constitution was ratified by a vote of 57-47. Id. at
83 n.52. See also 13 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE
CONSTITUTION xli-xlii (Merrill Jensen et al. eds., 1976).
47

1 ANNALS OF CONG. 451 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (emphasis added).

48

Id. at 796 (1789) (proposal of Fisher Ames, Aug. 20, 1789).

49

Steven K. Green, Federalism and the Establishment Clause: A Reassessment, 38
CREIGHTON L. REV. 761, 778 (2005) (“The standing order in Massachusetts, New Hampshire
and Connecticut, however, were not convinced and viewed their systems of religious
assessments as respecting rights of conscience. More important, they did not associate their
systems with ‘religious establishments.’”).
50
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particular religions. In response, Madison stated “that the purpose of his amendment
was to recognize restrictions on congressional power. He meant to assure
[Congressman] Sylvester and [Congressman] Huntington that the amendment would
not abolish state establishments, which seems to have been their fear.”51
Throughout the discussions of the Establishment Clause in the First Congress,
one searches in vain for any statement that the Establishment Clause was designed to
mandate a “wall of separation” between church and state. Instead, the amendment
was enacted to insure that the federal government would not interfere with state
regulation of religion—whatever form that regulation would take.
The
Establishment Clause was cited as a means of protecting diverse state regulations of
religion—including state establishments—rather than a proposal for mandating a
universal separation of church and state.
IV. ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE FEDERALISM
Over the past 20 years, federalism has emerged as the central theme in attempts
to understand the Establishment Clause. Justice Clarence Thomas has endorsed this
Federalist interpretation. In a concurring opinion filed in Elk Grove Unified School
District v. Newdow,52 Justice Thomas wrote: “[T]he Establishment Clause is best
understood as a federalism provision—it protects state establishments from federal
interference but does not protect any individual right.”53 Similarly, Professor Steven
D. Smith has asserted that the religion clauses were “purely jurisdictional in
nature.”54 In other words, Congress adopted the clauses “merely to assign
jurisdiction over matters of religion to the states.”55 A number of other
commentators have advanced similar readings of the Establishment Clause.56

51

1 ANNALS OF CONG. 757-79 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (emphasis added).

52

Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004).

53

Id. at 50 (Thomas, J., concurring).

54

STEVEN D. SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE: THE QUEST
PRINCIPLE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 17 (1995).
55

FOR A

CONSTITUTIONAL

Id. at 26.

56

See, e.g., David O. Conkle, Toward a General Theory of the Establishment Clause, 82
NW. U. L. REV. 1113, 1142 (1988) (discussing the “federalistic motivation for the
establishment clause”); William K. Lietzau, Rediscovering the Establishment Clause:
Federalism and the Rollback of Incorporation, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 1191, 1191 (1990) (stating
that the Establishment Clause left religious regulation to the states); Vincent Phillip Munoz,
The Original Meaning of the Establishment Clause and the Impossibility of its Incorporation,
8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 585, 588 (2006) (endorsing a federalism interpretation of the
Establishment Clause); Richard C. Schragger, The Role of the Local in the Doctrine and
Discourse of Religious Liberty, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1810, 1823 (2004) (indicating that the
religion clauses were intended to leave “local regulations of religion not only untouched by,
but also protected from, national encroachment”); Douglas G. Smith, The Establishment
Clause: Corollary of Eighteenth-Century Corporate Law?, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 239, 240 (2003)
(describing the Establishment Clause as a “‘federalism-based’ guarantee,” which “merely
delineates the proper roles of the federal and state governments with respect to religious
establishments”).
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A. What Separation Of Church and State Meant to Jefferson
The term “separation of church and state” appeared rarely, if at all, in discussions
about the Establishment Clause in the First Congress, and in the state ratifying
conventions. Yet in his now famous 1802 letter to the Danbury Baptists, Thomas
Jefferson wrote: “I contemplate with sovereign reverence that act of the whole
American people which declared that their legislature should ‘make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof,’ thus
building a wall of separation between Church & State.”57 Jefferson was a deliberate
writer, who chose his words carefully. When Jefferson chose the words “wall of
separation between church and state,” what did he mean?
In his book on Jefferson’s metaphor, Daniel L. Dreisbach concludes that
Jefferson’s “wall” was intended to separate the federal government from regulation
of religion, which was left to the states. As Dreisbach observes: “There is little
evidence to indicate that Jefferson thought the [wall of separation] metaphor
encapsulated a universal principle of religious liberty or of the prudential
relationships between religion and all civil government (local, state, and federal).”58
Instead, the metaphor “affirmed the policy of federalism.”59
Throughout his lifetime, Jefferson repeatedly stated his federalist views of the
Establishment Clause. In response to the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798, Jefferson
drafted the Kentucky Resolutions. Jefferson’s draft states his view of the First
Amendment and the Establishment Clause as a federalist provision. The Alien and
Sedition Acts were flawed because they regulated speech—a power that the
Constitution had reserved for the states. But beyond the acts themselves, Jefferson’s
Kentucky Resolutions contained a remarkably clear statement of the Establishment
Clause as a federalist provision. Jefferson wrote that the federal government had “no
power over the freedom of religion, freedom of speech, or freedom of the press,
being delegated to the United States by the Constitution . . . . [A]ll lawful powers
respecting the same did of right remain, and were reserved to the states, or to the
people . . . .”60
In 1805, Jefferson returned to this federalist theme in his second inaugural
address. In the address, Jefferson asserted:
In matters of religion, I have considered that its free exercise is placed by
the constitution independent of the powers of the general [i.e. federal]
government. I have therefore undertaken, on no occasion, to prescribe the
religious exercises suited to it; but have left them, as the constitution

57
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to a Committee of the Danbury Baptist Association,
supra note 3, at 281-82.
58
DANIEL L. DREISBACH, THOMAS JEFFERSON
CHURCH AND STATE 70 (2002).
59
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Id. at 69.

60

THOMAS JEFFERSON, KENTUCKY RESOLUTIONS OF 1798 AND 1799, reprinted in 5 THE
FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 131, 132 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987)
(hereinafter KENTUCKY RESOLUTIONS).
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found them, under the direction and discipline of State or Church
authorities acknowledged by the several religious societies.61
Once again, the passage provides a clear statement of Jefferson’s federalist
interpretation of religious regulation. Religious exercise was “independent of the
powers of the federal government,” and could be regulated only by “State or Church
authorities.”
In a January 23, 1808 letter to Rev. Samuel Miller, Jefferson again stated this
federalist theme clearly. Jefferson wrote:
I consider the government of the United States as interdicted by the
Constitution from intermeddling with religious institutions, their
doctrines, discipline, or exercises. This results not only from the
provision that no law shall be made respecting the establishment or free
exercise of religion [the First Amendment], but from that also which
reserves to the States the powers not delegated to the United States [the
Tenth Amendment] . . . It must then rest with the States, as far as it can
be in any human authority.62
Like the prior statements, this passage treats the First Amendment as a jurisdictional
provision that prevents the federal government from “intermeddling with religious
institutions.” Any power to legislate with respect to religion must “rest with the
states.” Dreisbach concludes:
Jefferson’s “wall,” like the First Amendment affirmed the policy of
federalism. This policy emphasized that all governmental authority over
religious matters was allocated to the states . . . Insofar as Jefferson’s
“wall,” like the First Amendment, was primarily jurisdictional (or
structural) in nature, it offered little in the way of a substantive right or
universal principle of religious liberty.63
B. Other Federalist Interpretations of the Establishment Clause
The preceding section focuses on Jefferson’s federalist view of the Establishment
Clause, because Jefferson authored the “separation of church and state” metaphor
that has proven so influential. However, Jefferson’s federalist views were not
unique or idiosyncratic. To the contrary, during the founding period everyone
understood that the Establishment Clause was a federalist provision. In other words,
the Establishment Clause was enacted in order to prevent federal interference with
state regulation of religion, whatever form that regulation took.
After Jefferson, Madison is the framing era figure who receives the most
attention in the Supreme Court’s early Everson decision. Justice Rutledge actually
attached Madison’s Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments as
an appendix to his Everson dissent. Like Jefferson, Madison did not endorse a
separationist interpretation of the Establishment Clause.
61

Thomas Jefferson, Second Inaugural Address (Mar. 4 1805), in 3 THE WRITINGS
THOMAS JEFFERSON 320, 323 (Andrew A. Lipscomb ed., 1905).
62

Letter to Reverend Miller, supra note 4, at 428.

63

DREISBACH, supra note 58, at 69.
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Instead, Madison endorsed the same non-interference principle described by
Jefferson. For example, at the Virginia Ratifying Convention in 1788, Madison said
that under the Constitution, “[t]here is not a shadow of right in the general
government to intermeddle with religion.”64
When Jefferson published the Kentucky Resolution in 1798, Madison published
the Virginia Resolution. Like the Kentucky Resolution, Madison’s resolution relied
on the principle of federalism to protest the federal Alien and Sedition Acts.
Notably, the Virginia Resolution asserted that the federal government had no power
to regulate “the liberty of conscience, and of the press,” because such powers had not
been “delegated by the Constitution, and consequently withheld from the [federal]
government.” In arguing that the federal government lacked the power to regulate
the press, the Virginia Resolution relied on the premise that the federal government
obviously lacked any power to interfere with the regulation of religion in the
individual states. Madison wrote: “Any construction or argument, then, which
would turn the amendment into a grant or acknowledgment of power, with respect to
the press, might be equally applied to the freedom of religion.”65
Later in life, Madison came to endorse a separation of church and state, similar in
many ways to modern separationist views. In 1822, after Madison had served his
two terms as president, Madison wrote to Edward Livingston, a prominent Louisiana
lawyer who would later represent the state in the House of Representatives. In this
letter, Madison noted his “approbation” when the first Congress had “appointed
Chaplains, to be paid from the Natl. [National] Treasury.”66 Madison also sought to
qualify his Thanksgiving proclamations as “absolutely indiscriminate, and merely
recommendatory; or rather mere designations of a day, on which all who thought
proper might unite in consecrating it to religious purposes, according to their own
faith & forms.”67 Madison concluded: “Every new & successful example therefore
of a perfect separation between ecclesiastical and civil matters, is of importance.”68
Madison’s statements in his letter to Livingston refer only to the relationship
between the federal government and religion. Nothing in this letter, or in other late
writings by Madison, contends that the federal government should interfere with
state regulation of religion. To the contrary, Madison may have argued for a
complete separation between the federal government and religion, in order to prevent
the federal government from interfering with state religious regulation. At any rate,
it is unclear whether this letter, written by Madison in 1822, sheds much light on the
original intent of the framers of Establishment Clause, enacted more than 20 years
earlier.
Like Jefferson and Madison, other framers endorsed the non-interference
principle. In their view, the individual states had plenary power to determine
church-state relationships. The First Amendment guaranteed that the federal
64

MADISON, supra note 43, at 88.

65

4 JONATHAN ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 577 (2nd ed. 1836).

ON THE

66

Letter from James Madison to Edward Livingston (July 10, 1822), in 5 THE FOUNDERS'
CONSTITUTION 105 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987).
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Id.
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Id.
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government would not interfere in whatever arrangements the states made. For
example, consider James Iredell’s statement before the North Carolina Ratifying
Convention:
Had Congress undertaken to guaranty religious freedom, or any particular
species of it, they would then have had a pretence to interfere in a subject
they have nothing to do with. Each state, so far as the clause in question
does not interfere, must be left to the operation of its own principles.69
Similarly, during Virginia’s Ratification Convention, Governor Edmund Randolph
stated that under the Constitution, “no power is given expressly to Congress over
religion.”70
In his treatise on the Constitution, Joseph Story noted the framers’ views that all
power to regulate religion remained exclusively with the states. Story wrote: “[T]he
whole power over the subject of religion is left exclusively to the state governments,
to be acted upon according to their own sense of justice, and the state constitutions . .
. .”71 Similarly, William Rawle wrote in 1829: “The first amendment prohibits
congress from passing any law respecting an establishment of religion, or preventing
the free exercise of it. It would be difficult to conceive on what possible
construction of the Constitution such a power could ever be claimed by congress.”72
C. Was Federal Support For Religion Consistent With Federalism?
With the enactment of the Establishment Clause, the framers seemed to agree
with James Madison’s 1788 statement before the Virginia Ratifying Convention,
where Madison asserted: “There is not a shadow of right in the general government
to intermeddle with religion. Its least interference with it, would be a most flagrant
usurption.”73 But at the same time, the federal government designated holidays for
prayer, authorized legislative prayer, appointed and compensated chaplains, and
engaged in other acts designed to endorse and support religion. If the federal
government lacked the power to “intermeddle with religion,” how did the
government have the authority to enact these measures that supported religion?
At one point, Thomas Jefferson suggested that the federal government lacked
such authority. Unlike Presidents Washington and Adams before him and President
Madison after him, Jefferson refused to issue Thanksgiving proclamations. In his
1808 letter to Rev. Samuel Miller, Jefferson explained that he refused to issue these
proclamations because the Constitution prohibited the federal government “from

69

Debate in North Carolina Ratifying Convention (July 30, 1788), reprinted in 5 THE
FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 90 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987) (emphasis
added).
70

3 JONATHAN ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 204 (2d ed. 1836).
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JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 992, at
702 (Carolina Academic Press 1987).
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intermeddling with religious institutions, their doctrines, discipline, or exercises.”74
Whether Jefferson in fact consistently viewed the Constitution as completely
prohibiting any federal action in support of religion is debatable. As noted above, in
1803 Jefferson had endorsed a treaty with the Kaskaskia Indian Tribe that authorized
the use of federal funds to finance the construction of a church on the tribe’s land
and to compensate a Catholic priest for the tribe.75 This treaty suggests that in
Jefferson’s view, the federal government could support religion without running
afoul of the Establishment Clause.
Even if Jefferson in fact read the Establishment Clause as mandating a complete
prohibition on federal support for religion, the other framers seemed to agree on a
less restrictive reading of the clause. Consistent with the many statements quoted
above, the Establishment Clause prohibited the federal government from interfering
with any state’s regulation of religion.76 However, this did not mean that the federal
government was categorically prohibited from aiding religion. The federal
government could aid religion, as long as this aid did not interfere with state
religious regulation.
In reviewing the federal support of religion described in Part II, it is apparent that
none of these federal actions conflicted with state religious regulation.77 Authorizing
prayers before meetings of the federal Congress, and appointing chaplains for the
federal army would not conflict with state religious regulation. Similarly, funding a
church and priest for the Kaskaskia Indian Tribe would not conflict with state
religious regulation, because the tribe was outside the states’ jurisdiction.
Of the early federal initiatives relating to religion, the days of prayer proclaimed
by early presidents were the only federal enactments that might possibly infringe on
state authority. But because all of the American states continued to endorse religion
and prayer as a positive force, it is hard to see how a day of prayer would interfere
with state religious regulation. At least this seems to have been the judgments of
Presidents Washington Adams, and Madison—who all issued Thanksgiving
resolutions.
V. EVERSON V. BOARD OF EDUCATION: THE ORIGINS OF ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
DISTORTION
In Everson v. Board of Education,78 the Supreme Court laid the foundation of
modern Establishment Clause doctrine—including the emphasis on a “separation of
church and state.” As discussed above, the framers intended that the Establishment
Clause would operate as a shield, insulating state regulation of religion from the
federal government. Beginning with Everson, modern doctrine has effectively stood
the Establishment Clause on its head. Everson and other modern Establishment
Clause cases have effectively turned the Establishment Clause into sword,
authorizing the federal government to interfere in areas traditionally regulated by the
states.
74

Letter to Reverend Miller, supra note 4, at 428.
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See supra text accompanying note 16.
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See supra text accompanying notes 60-72.
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See supra text accompanying notes 6-26.
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https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol59/iss4/7

16

2011]

THE MYTH OF CHURCH-STATE SEPARATION

639

Everson dealt with a New Jersey statute which required local school boards to
reimburse private school students for the cost of bus transportation to school.79
Justice Black’s majority opinion claimed to review the history of the Establishment
Clause. However, the history was not that of the Establishment Clause itself, but
rather, of the successful battle for an end to religious assessments in the State of
Virginia. This was a serious error.
According to the Everson majority, the dispute about the proper relationship
between church and state “reached its dramatic climax in Virginia in 1785-86 when
the Virginia legislative body was about to renew Virginia’s tax levy for the support
of the established church.”80 The Court noted that Thomas Jefferson and James
Madison “led the fight against this tax.”81 The Everson majority further noted
Madison’s Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, where
Madison purportedly argued:
that a true religion did not need the support of law; that no person, either
believer or non-believer, should be taxed to support a religious institution
of any kind; that the best interest of a society required that the minds of
men always be wholly free; and that cruel persecutions were the
inevitable result of government-established religions.82
The Court continued that the Virginia legislature not only declined to renew the
tax levy, but also enacted Jefferson’s Bill for Religious Liberty.83 The Everson
Court then quoted Jefferson’s bill: “‘That no man shall be compelled to frequent or
support any religious worship, place, or ministry whatsoever, nor shall be enforced,
restrained, molested, or burthened, in his body or goods, nor shall otherwise suffer,
on account of his religious opinions or belief . . . .’”84
The Court’s myopic focus on Virginia was odd. In Everson, the Justices were
interpreting the federal Establishment Clause, not the Virginia Bill for Religious
Liberty. This perplexing focus on the events in Virginia led the Court to make a
serious error, which would distort the development of Establishment Clause law to
the present day. Writing for the Everson majority, Justice Black now asserted:
“This Court has previously recognized that the provisions of the First Amendment,
in the drafting and adoption of which Madison and Jefferson played such leading
roles, had the same objective and were intended to provide the same protection
against governmental intrusion on religious liberty as the Virginia statute.”85
The goals of Jefferson and Madison in advocating the Virginia Bill for Religious
Liberty, and their goals in advocating the First Amendment were entirely different.
In the Virginia Bill for Religious Liberty, Jefferson and Madison were advocating an
approach for the single State of Virginia to a single problem—assessments collected
79

See id. at 3, n.1.
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Id. at 11.
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Id. at 11-12.
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by the state, and paid to the dominant Anglican Church. In the First Amendment,
the framers were attempting to define the proper relationship between the federal
government and the states. This First Amendment was a complicated project
because the thirteen states had developed several different approaches to the
relationship between church and state. To say that Madison and Jefferson had “the
same objective” in drafting the Virginia Bill for Religious Freedom and the First
Amendment was simply wrong.
While Jefferson and Madison clearly played a pivotal role in the enactment of the
United States Constitution and the First Amendment, Justice Black’s myopic
Everson focus on Jefferson and Madison renders his historical account incomplete
and inaccurate.
For example, Justice Black completely ignores George
Washington’s Farewell Address, where Washington advocated the importance of
religion in public life. While Madison and Jefferson were important framers, they
were not the only framers.
Even with respect to the views of Madison and Jefferson, Justice Black’s account
is seriously misleading. Robert Cord writes that after reading the Everson decision,
“one might come to the conclusion that Madison and Jefferson fought the battle for
religious freedom in Virginia, wrote a few letters on the subject, and then retired.”86
Justice Black’s majority opinion fails to mention any of the Federalist writings by
Jefferson and Madison. The Everson opinion completely omits any discussion of the
Kentucky and Virginia resolutions, even though scholars always have treated these
resolutions as some of the most important political documents from the early United
States. Either Justice Black was unaware of the resolutions or—worse yet—
deliberately declined to discuss the resolutions, because such a discussion would
undermine Justice Black’s church-state separation principle.
While the Everson majority opinion spent considerable time discussing the
Virginia dispute on religious assessments, Justice Black entirely ignores the adoption
of the federal Establishment Clause, even though this is the provision at issue in
Everson. As Robert Cord writes: “[T]he Everson opinion is devoid of any attempt to
explore the actions and debates of the First Congress which proposed to the States
what would become the First Amendment.”87 Obviously, this was a serious
omission. For example, the Everson Court entirely ignores the house discussion of
the First Amendment, where Madison assured Representative Sylvester and
Representative Huntington that the Establishment Clause “would not abolish state
establishments.”88 This discussion is yet another piece of critical evidence that is not
mentioned by the Everson Court.
Given these wholesale omissions, it is not surprising that Justice Black’s
discussion of Establishment Clause history contains misstatements. Consider Justice
Black’s concluding statement about the history of the Establishment Clause:

86

ROBERT L. CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE: HISTORICAL FACT AND CURRENT
FICTION 120 (1982).
87

Id. at 121.
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Munoz, supra note 56, at 627 (citing 1 ANNALS
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The “establishment of religion” clause of the First Amendment means at
least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church.
Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer
one religion over another . . . . No tax in any amount, large or small, can
be levied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they
may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice
religion.89
Justice Black continued: “In the words of Jefferson, the clause against
establishment of religion by law was intended to erect ‘a wall of separation between
church and State.’”90
Much of this statement is demonstrably wrong. Consider Justice Black’s
statement that “neither a State nor the Federal Government” could pass laws that
“aid all religions.” This article has presented a list of examples where the federal
government did aid religion—including Thanksgiving proclamations, legislative
prayer, the conscientious objector provision, and land grants to churches.
Also, when the Establishment Clause was adopted, several states maintained
established churches.91 If the Establishment Clause really did provide that a state
could not aid religion, then the representatives from those states never would have
voted for an amendment that outlawed their state’s practices. To the contrary, one of
the key proponents of the First Amendment was Fisher Ames, whose home state of
Massachusetts collected tax assessments to support the dominant Congregational
Church. Justice Black’s account of history also ignores Madison’s own statement
during the house debates, that the Establishment Clause “would not abolish state
establishments.”92 This statement directly contradicts Justice Black’s claim that
under the Establishment Clause, states could not aid religion.
As a historical account, Justice Black’s Everson majority opinion is an abject
failure. But given the multitude of errors, one suspect’s that this opinion never really
was about a faithful rendition of the original understanding of the Establishment
Clause.93 Instead, the opinion was about reshaping history for another purpose.
The Everson opinion was all about power. Justice Black and his colleagues saw
the Establishment Clause as a means for the federal courts to exercise power.
Indeed, Supreme Court decisions since Everson have used the Establishment Clause
to intrude into a variety of areas previously reserved for the states. Federal courts
have cited the Establishment Clause as a means of regulating private school

89

Everson, 330 U.S. at 15-16.

90

Id. at 16.
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Ultimately, the Everson Court upheld the New Jersey bus reimbursement statute.
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concluding that the New Jersey statute was constitutional. In the final analysis, Justice
Black’s extended discourse about the Establishment Clause was nothing more than dicta.
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funding,94 public school curriculum and events,95 religious symbols,96 and
miscellaneous cases involving state religious regulation.97
The Court’s intervention in state affairs reached a particularly low point in
Epperson v. Arkansas.98 In Epperson, the Court invalidated an Arkansas law that
prohibited public school instructors from teaching the evolutionary account of man's
origins. The law intended to promote teaching creationism, or the biblical account of
man’s origins.
The Epperson Court wrote the anti-evolution law violated the Establishment
Clause, because the law wasn’t “neutral.”99 The Justices wrote that Government
“may not be hostile to any religion or to the advocacy of no-religion; and it may not
aid, foster, or promote one religion or religious theory against another or even
against the militant opposite.”100
Of course, the anti-evolution law wasn’t “neutral.” But any regulation specifying
school curriculum won’t be neutral. For example, laws requiring that students learn
basic science and scientific methods aren’t “neutral.” Religious believers may view
such courses as improperly elevating empirical testing as the basis for wisdom, as
opposed to the importance of belief based on faith. Similarly, one might object to a
curriculum that required (or prohibited) Ernest Hemingway’s classic short novel Old
Man And The Sea, given the explicit religious symbolism used throughout the
book.101 But given the popularity of both Hemingway and this book, no court has
held that Old Man and The Sea amounts to an establishment of religion.
94

Compare Zelman v. Simons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (upholding a state voucher
program, where most voucher payments went to families with students attending private
religious schools), with Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (striking down a state
statute that authorized salary supplements for private school teachers).
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See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (holding that a prayer at a graduation
ceremony violated the Establishment Clause); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968)
(finding that a law mandating that public schools cannot teach evolution violated the
Establishment Clause).
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Compare McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU of Kentucky, 545 U.S. 844 (2005) (holding that a
Ten Commandments display in a courthouse violated the Establishment Clause), with Van
Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005) (holding that a Ten Commandments display at the Texas
state capital did not violate the Establishment Clause).
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99

See id. at 103.

100

Id.

101
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high school courses. Hemingway’s novel is about an old and unsuccessful fisherman who
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Epperson involved the specter of federal intervention in its most heavy-handed
and distasteful form. While the Justices cited the Establishment Clause as authority
for their objections to teaching creationism over evolution, this was clearly a pretext
for federal judges who simply didn’t accept the plausibility of a creationist account
of man’s origins. In Epperson, the Justices seemed to be dictating to the Arkansas
legislature how to run the state’s schools.
The Establishment Clause activism in cases like Everson and Epperson
represents a bitter irony. The Establishment Clause was enacted to insulate state
religious regulation from the federal government. Yet in Epperson, the United
States Court used the Establishment Clause—a provisions designed to protect state
decisions from federal interference—as a basis for overturning a state legislative
decision regarding school curriculum.
Modern Establishment Clause cases have literally turned the clause on its head.
The Establishment Clause was meant as a shield, to protect state religious regulation.
But the Supreme Court has turned the Establishment Clause into a sword, precisely
for the purpose of overturning these state decisions.
V. CONCLUSION
A review of early American history demonstrates that the framers did not intend
a separation of church and state. The federal government appointed and
compensated chaplains and priests, authorized legislative prayers, issued
Thanksgiving proclamations, and endorsed many other measures intended to support
religions.
When the framers enacted the First Amendment clause prohibiting an
“establishment of religion,” what did they mean? Madison’s first draft of the First
Amendment is instructive. This draft provided: “The civil rights of none shall be
abridged on account of religious belief or worship, nor shall any national religion be
established, nor shall the full and equal rights of conscience be in any manner, or on
any pretext, infringed.”102 As indicated by the subsequent remarks of Jefferson,
Madison, and others, the Establishment Clause that eventually found its way into the
First Amendment adopted this federalism principle. The federal government had no
power to intrude on state regulation of religious institutions, whatever form the state
regulations might take. Regardless of whether states enacted a no-aid policy, or
provided generous preferential aid to a single state-established church, the federal
government was powerless to interfere.
During the framing period, no one believed that the Establishment Clause
imposed a “wall of separation” between church and state. The Establishment Clause
was not designed to isolate the state from religion. Rather, Jefferson’s metaphorical
wall was designed to protect state regulation of religion from interference by the
federal government. In other words, the Establishment Clause was a shield,
designed to protect the states from the federal government. Paradoxically, the
Supreme Court has used the Establishment Clause as a sword, to strike down state
laws regulating religion. In these decisions, the Court has turned the Establishment
Clause on its head.
translation for this word and perhaps it is just a noise such as a man might make, involuntarily,
feeling the nail go through his hands and into the wood.” ERNEST HEMINGWAY, THE OLD MAN
AND THE SEA (1952).
102

1 ANNALS OF CONG. 451 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789) (emphasis added).
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The concept of “separation of church and state” is an entirely artificial construct,
having no basis in the language or history of the Establishment Clause. Nonetheless,
the so-called “church state separation principle” has served a purpose for the
Supreme Court. The Court has used this metaphor as a basis for regulating state aid
to private schools, religion in the public schools, religious symbols, and other
controversies.
Perhaps the Court can justify such decision by invoking public policy—although
the wisdom of such second-guessing of discretionary legislative decisions is highly
problematic. However, it is not possible to justify the Court’s intervention based on
a historical church-state separation principle. No such historical principle exists.
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